
15. Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and famine-like conditions in Northeast Nigeria

Ernest Ogbozor

INTRODUCTION

The food crises in Northeast Nigeria have reached famine-like levels after more than 16 years of recovery efforts from the Boko Haram insurgency. Despite being one of Africa's largest economies with significant oil wealth and agricultural potential, Nigeria struggles with widespread food insecurity and famine risk, particularly in the Northeast region. The continuing food crises raise the question of why these challenges persist despite prolonged efforts to contain and recover from the insurgency. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the ongoing violence and instability can be attributed to historical social and economic tensions, unsustainable agricultural practices, erratic weather patterns, and environmental factors (FAO 2017). Additionally, the war economy, government policies, and the detrimental impacts of counterinsurgency efforts have further exacerbated instability and food shortages in predominantly agrarian communities of the country (ICG 2017, cited in Ogbozor 2019, p. 37).

The FAO and World Food Programme (WFP 2023) have underscored that violent conflict, economic shocks, climate extremes, and soaring fertilizer prices have precipitated an unprecedented food crisis in several countries, including Afghanistan, South Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, and Nigeria. According to the FAO and WFP, these countries are considered hunger hotspots, where as many as 828 million people globally are uncertain about their next meal. In Nigeria, the WFP (2023) has warned about the impact of conflict, insecurity, inflation, and climate change on widespread hunger. It predicts that 26.5 million Nigerians will face acute hunger by the lean season of 2024, up from 18.6 million in 2023. The conflict in the Northeast region has displaced 2.2 million people and left 4.4 million people food insecure, with Borno State bearing the brunt (WFP 2023).

While it is a fact that the military counterinsurgency campaign has significantly reduced insurgency activities in Nigeria's volatile region, it has also been implicated in the perpetuation of instability. The heightened military presence and restrictions in the region have disrupted agricultural activities and livelihoods, curtailed access to essential services, and escalated tensions between security forces and local communities (ICG 2017). Given the unique circumstances of Northeast Nigeria, it is imperative to comprehend why efforts to address the aftermath of the Boko Haram insurgency have not yielded the desired outcome. Fundamental inquiries include how the Boko Haram insurgency contributes to the food crisis, whether counterinsurgency efforts exacerbate the situation, and what underlying factors are sustaining the crisis and the responses. To effectively tackle the intricate interplay between insurgency, counterinsurgency, and food crises in Northeast Nigeria, a comprehensive approach that encompasses security, humanitarian, and development interventions is not just a recommendation but a necessity.

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

Throughout its history, Boko Haram has been relentless in its efforts to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria since the late 2000s. This has resulted in widespread violence, attacks on lives and livelihoods, and the displacement of millions of people in rural communities. The insurgency has unfolded in three distinct but interconnected phases – the *Kanama*, the *dawah*, and the violent phases (Mohammed 2014). The violent phase, in particular, has severely impacted civilians, livelihoods, and, to an extent, is associated with the prolonged food crises in Northeast Nigeria and other areas in the Lake Chad Basin (Ogbozor 2019). Examining these phases is crucial for understanding the historical development of food crises and famine-like conditions in the country’s northeastern region.

The Kanama phase symbolizes the period when the “Nigerian Taliban,” later known as Boko Haram, openly challenged the Nigerian authorities for the first time (Mohammed 2014, p. 10). Following a confrontation with law enforcement, the Nigerian Taliban retreated from the urban areas of Maiduguri Metropolis in December 2003 to a rural village called Kanama in the Yunusari local government area of Yobe State, Northeast Nigeria (Mohammed 2014, p. 12). Concerning food crises, it can be inferred that Kanama marked the beginning of the militants’ relocation from the city to remote agrarian communities. According to the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), farming, fisheries, and herding are the primary activities in the rural areas, employing over 80 percent of the local population (LCBC 2016). The relocation of militants from the city to agrarian communities thus posed a risk to farming communities. This strategy was repeated in 2013 after Boko Haram was driven out of the Maiduguri metropolis by the combined Nigerian security forces, consisting of the Civilian Joint Task Force and the Joint Task Force; the militants found safe havens in remote farming communities (Ladbury et al. 2016, p. 3).

The choice of rural Kanama as a base and camp for the militant group was influenced by its remote geography and location, which provided natural protection from outside threats. Initially, the long-term effects of the militants’ presence in rural agrarian communities were not fully recognized until the later stages of the conflict. Boko Haram strategically utilized remote agricultural areas as hiding places to avoid detection by security forces. However, this tactic had detrimental consequences for the local population, leading to negative impacts on rural livelihoods, such as increasing insecurity, occupying farmland, and disrupting subsistence agriculture and rural lifestyle.

Between the Kanama uprising’s collapse to the initial suppression of Boko Haram in July 2009, a phase known as the *dawah* phase (Mohammed 2014, p. 13) emerged. This phase was characterized by Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, referring to the group as “*dawah*” and its members as “brothers.” The *dawah* phase focused on building a close-knit group of followers who were deeply committed to their cause and demonstrated unwavering loyalty to their leader. It involved the gradual indoctrination and recruitment of members by the militant sect, with many members being drawn from agricultural communities. Some individuals were enticed to join the militant group through incentives, leading to a progressive shift away from agriculture to other livelihood activities.

Also, during the period of *dawah*, “Operation Flush” was implemented in Borno State to regulate motorbike traffic, locally known as *Okada*. The enforcement aimed to address violations of traffic regulations and the misuse of motorbikes for criminal activities. As a result,

Okada services were banned in the state capital and some local government areas. However, this prohibition led to increased unemployment, crime, and the radicalization of youths who relied on Okada for commercial purposes and transporting farm produce. Consequently, frustration and anger arose among the affected population, with some individuals turning to militant groups for alternative opportunities (Haruna 2015). The *dawah* later culminated in the first major confrontation of Boko Haram with law enforcement.

The violent phase of Boko Haram commenced in mid-2009 and was characterized by heightened violence, widespread abductions, territorial control, and the expansion of violence into Nigerian neighboring countries. According to Ladbury et al. (2016), the group transitioned from looting livestock and kidnapping to gaining territorial control and state building. The captured areas were given new names, reflecting the vulnerability of rural communities to Boko Haram. By early 2015, Boko Haram had taken control of approximately 52,000 square kilometers of Nigerian territory, predominantly agrarian communities, leading to a decline in crop production and the onset of food crises in rural areas (Ogbozor 2019).

This resulted in significant harm to the local population, including loss of life, displacements, and the destruction of livelihoods. According to the World Bank and UNHCR (2016), the militants forcibly expelled farmers from their land, leading to the abandonment of 5,000 hectares (12,350 acres) of wheat and rice fields in the Marte village area of Borno State near Lake Chad.

The World Bank and UNHCR estimate that 650,000 people from Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa were displaced from their homes, many of whom are farmers, resulting in a significant decline in food production and household food stocks. As of mid-2016, Boko Haram militants have caused over 20,000 deaths, with approximately 2.6 million people internally displaced and 170,000 refugees in Nigeria (World Bank and UNHCR 2016).

Additionally, a comparison of pre-Boko Haram livelihood activities with those during the insurgency shows that before the Boko Haram insurgency, livelihood activities primarily involved farming, herding, fishing, and trading (Ogbozor 2019). However, most people engaged in non-farm activities during the insurgency period, indicating a shift in livelihood strategies, according to Ogbozor. Insecurity caused by the presence of the armed group significantly hindered agricultural activities, such as farming, animal grazing, fishing, and trading in farm products. Boko Haram's occupation of local government areas in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states disrupted farming activities and displaced rural farmers. A UNHCR study at the Minawao refugee camp in Cameroon showed that most of the Nigerian refugees were initially engaged in farming (71 percent), trading (22 percent), and cattle herding (8 percent), reflecting a decline in agricultural production, which is a crucial livelihood activity in the affected areas (World Bank and UNHCR 2016). These highlights are evidence of the evolution of food crises in Northeast Nigeria since the onset of the Boko Haram insurgency.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

While there is an ongoing debate about the connection between the military counterinsurgency campaigns in Northeast Nigeria and the ongoing food crises in the region, the genesis of food insecurity, as earlier highlighted, points to the deep root and the complex nature of the problem. Although it is a known fact that the military interventions led to a drastic decrease in Boko Haram attacks, a look back at the consequences of the aggressive military campaigns

suggests that the nature and tactics of these campaigns had intended and unintended effects on the agrarian communities of Northeast Nigeria. According to The New Humanitarian, movement restrictions, fuel sales bans, mobile communication bans, market closures, road blockades, farming bans, and border closures were enforced by the military task force to hinder Boko Haram's mobility and infiltration. These measures significantly affected livelihoods, agricultural trade, and the once-thriving livestock industry in Northeastern Nigeria (The New Humanitarian 2017). The government's counterinsurgency approach reportedly further marginalized, isolated, and complicated the lives of the rural populace.

In 2011 and 2012, the Nigerian government implemented policies and military strategies to address the growing threat of Boko Haram. Despite the declaration of a state of emergency (SoE) in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in mid-2013, the insurgency persisted, leading to disruptions in economic activities such as trade and farming (CFR 2013). As the conflict intensified, it impacted markets, reducing trade, causing higher food prices, and diminished coping mechanisms. Bomb attacks forced the closure of numerous markets, roads, border points, and substantial post-harvest losses for farmers. The closure of major cattle markets, including the Gamboru market, and the prohibition of fish sales near Lake Chad were part of the government's efforts to disrupt Boko Haram's financial activities (WFP 2016; ICG 2017, p. 4). These measures directly impacted food resources and livelihoods, affecting not only Nigeria but also neighboring countries due to the closure of markets in the Northeast region.

As the insurgents ramped up activities between 2014 and 2015, subsequent counterinsurgency operations coupled with insecurity resulted in mass movement and the displacement of a significant number of individuals from Northeastern Nigeria to neighboring countries, including Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. This period also saw loss of life, property destruction, critical local infrastructure collapse, livelihood capitals, and formal education disruption. According to UNHCR (2015), an estimated 4.6 million people, predominantly farmers, were displaced, and the humanitarian impact of the crisis extended to other areas in Northern Nigeria.

In response to the escalating threat from Boko Haram, the Nigerian government, in partnership with regional and international allies, initiated multinational counterinsurgency operations. These operations included extensive military offensives, such as air strikes, ground operations, and the deployment of special forces. In early 2015, a Multinational African Union force, mainly comprising members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and regional neighbors alongside Nigeria, launched a mop-up operation against Boko Haram militants before Nigeria's 2015 election. The multinational force achieved significant success, reclaiming nearly all territories previously held by Boko Haram within a month, a feat not accomplished by the military in the preceding five years (Ogbozor and Paden 2015). While the military campaign resulted in recapturing territory and weakening the group's operational capacity, it also led to unintended consequences for civilians. Amnesty International documented cases of civilian casualties, arbitrary arrests, and forced displacement stemming from military operations. Additionally, the militarization of the region disrupted agricultural activities and livelihoods, limited access to essential services, and escalated tensions between security forces and local communities (Amnesty International 2018).

The success of the Nigerian military and its multinational counterinsurgency partners in the battle with militants was significant in reclaiming almost the entire self-proclaimed "Islamic Caliphate" of the group before the 2015 election in Nigeria (Ogbozor and Paden 2015). The Nigerian administration also took proactive measures, including relocating the

military headquarters from Abuja to Borno State, the epicenter of Boko Haram's activities, and deploying troops to rural areas. The rebranding of the army operation from "Operation Zaman Lafiya" (peaceful) to "Operation Lafiya Dole" (peace by force) also demonstrated a solid commitment to ending insurgency in the Northeast through assertive measures. However, the decision to relocate the military base closer to the rural areas had unintended consequences for the agricultural communities, turning communities into a battleground between the military and the militants. This raised questions about whether the military strategy contributed to the crises in the rural communities.

Also, there were concerns about the coincidence of the launch of Operation Lafiya Dole despite the decline in militant activities following the post-2015 election mop-up operations. However, the new Nigerian administration was committed to fulfilling its election promise to eradicate insurgency. Operation Lafiya Dole had a significant impact, particularly in the BAY (Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States) areas of Northeast Nigeria. "Lafiya dole" translates to "peace by force" in the Hausa language (Ikeolu 2018). In the lead-up to Nigeria's 2015 election, a substantial counter-campaign was initiated, resulting in a notable decrease in Boko Haram activities. This shift led to the transformation of the operational mandate of the Military Joint Task Force (JTF) from a relatively passive force to an offensive one (Ikeolu 2018, p. 4). This change in approach was aimed at ultimately degrading and eliminating the militants. Acknowledging that the military triumph did not signify the conflict's conclusion is imperative. This underscores that while progress was made, more work is critical to achieving peace and stability. As a result, Boko Haram found itself on the defensive, losing ground, resources, and fighters. The Nigerian administration described subsequent attacks by the militant group as the "last kick of a dying horse" (Premium Times 2017).

Despite the widely celebrated technical defeat of Boko Haram by the Nigerian military, the militant group continues to pose a significant threat, directing its attacks toward civilians, livelihood assets, security forces, and humanitarian workers. The implementation of Operation Lafiya Dole in the face of a resilient terrorist organization incurred substantial costs and unintended consequences. Although Lafiya Dole, paradoxically, may have been regarded within military circles as a framework for peacebuilding, its overall impact has been detrimental rather than beneficial (McDappa 2021). The doctrine of imposing peace through force rather than through dialogue or negotiation undermines the very ideology it aims to foster (McDappa 2021). The era of Operation Lafiya Dole was characterized by aggressive military offensives and restrictions, resulting in casualties, hampered food production, and widespread displacement in agrarian communities (Ogbozor 2019, p. 1).

Lafiya Dole had similarities with earlier joint military task forces established for internal security operations in 1993 and in Ogoni and Odi in 1999, which were punitive military operations that led to massive destruction of lives and livelihoods (Onyi-Ogelle and Izimah 2023, p. 34). Some of the harsh military restrictions, such as the prolonged closure of roads, markets, and border points, can be linked to the period of Operation Lafiya Dole (Ogbozor 2025). In Borno State, for example, Ogbozor noted that critical roads such as Maiduguri-Dikwa-Gamboru Road, Maiduguri-Gubio Damasak, and Maiduguri-Mungono-Baga were shut down for up to three years due to security concerns (Ogbozor 2018). The closure of the Niger-Nigeria border also presented challenges for merchants and transporters, resulting in alterations in supply routes, escalated transportation expenses, and commodity price hikes (Ogbozor 2019).

Beyond rural Borno, the impact of insecurity and military restrictions on market functionality and trading extended to bordering countries, limiting cross-border trading and increasing local trading between primary and secondary markets. In border areas affected by insurgency, such as Northeast Nigeria, the Far North region of Cameroon, and the Diffa region of Niger, the closure of markets, roads, and border points has hindered movement and trading activities between the neighboring countries. Although the treaties of the Economic Community of West African States and the Lake Chad Basin Commission have historically facilitated interstate migration and cross-border trading among the Lake Chad riparian countries, the implementation of the treaty was suspended after being exploited by Boko Haram to carry out unrestricted cross-border attacks. This further led to a low supply of essential food in the Lake Chad Basin border communities.

FAMINE-LIKE CONDITIONS IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA

Several factors have been linked to the emergence of food crises and famine risk in Northeast Nigeria, including insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. As we move forward, the chapter will discuss why food crises persist in some parts of Northeast Nigeria, eventually leading to famine-like conditions. Despite Nigeria's status as Africa's largest economy and a population of over 220 million, the country grapples with widespread food insecurity, particularly in the Northeastern region (UNOCHA 2016). Although famine has not been officially declared in Nigeria, as per the United Nations (UN). According to the UN, famine is declared when "a minimum of 2 deaths per 10,000 people – or 4 deaths per 10,000 children – occur daily due to starvation, disease, or malnutrition; at least 20 percent of households experience extreme food shortages; and over 30 percent of children suffer from acute malnutrition" (WFP 2025).

Nonetheless, the near-famine condition in some areas of Northeast Nigeria was uncovered in mid-2016 when a humanitarian organization reported emergency levels of severe acute malnutrition and famine-like conditions affecting approximately 275,000 people in internally displaced camps in Borno State (United Nations 2016). The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) further noted that the affected areas and camps were in inaccessible and insecure regions, many of which were active conflict zones (The Guardian 2016).

The New Humanitarian added that 20 million people in South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Northeastern Nigeria were at risk of famine and maintained that the famine that gripped Ethiopia from 1983 to 1985 struggled for attention until it was far too late (2017). The re-emergence of famine and near-famine conditions in primarily African countries has become a cause for concern. According to The New Humanitarian, these four famines or near-famines have similarities, but they also have different origins, trajectories, and, therefore, different needs. Local factors were at play for The New Humanitarian, with each country prone to its own combination of flaring conflict, weak governance, poor infrastructure, and failing markets.

Among the four risked countries, a severe food crisis was reported in South Sudan, where famine was declared in four counties (Burns 2017). Yemen had the highest number of people facing hunger compared to the other nations, while Somalia urgently needed food aid due to a prolonged food crisis. Nigeria's situation was distinct because the severity of the humanitarian impact of the Boko Haram crisis was beginning to unfold, especially in Bama areas, where

over 2,000 “famine-related deaths” were reported. Still, limited information suggests the situation may be even worse than reported (The New Humanitarian 2017).

The food crises in Northeast Nigeria and some African countries were complicated during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS 2022) highlighted that the region has witnessed alarming levels of hunger and malnutrition due to sustained crises linked to insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, as well as the impacts of climate change, COVID-19, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The period of COVID-19 and the food crises associated with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict further complicated the recovery for countries grappling with insurgencies (ISS 2022).

The UN (cited in FAO and WFP 2022) collaborated with the Institute for Security Studies findings and emphasized a troubling increase in food insecurity across 20 hotspot areas with acute hunger. According to the UN, the populations most impacted were primarily located in South Sudan, Yemen, and the northern regions of Ethiopia and Nigeria. The UN attributed the continuing food crises to factors such as conflict, economic instability, natural disasters, and limited humanitarian access and called for immediate intervention to prevent famine, minimize loss of life, and safeguard livelihoods from collapsing.

In mid-2023, following the aftermath of COVID-19, the FAO and WFP further reported an unprecedented food crisis in several countries, including Nigeria, Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen. The continuing crisis was linked to violent conflict, economic shocks, climate extremes, and sharply rising fertilizer prices. The FAO and WFP maintained that as many as 828 million people globally are unsure of where their next meal will come from and warned that acute food insecurity is likely to exacerbate if organized violence and armed conflict persist in the affected countries. The report underlines that organized violence and armed conflict are continuing to drive acute food insecurity and unprecedented levels of instability in the so-called hunger hotspots areas of the globe (FAO and WFP 2023).

In Nigeria, the FAO and WFP (2023) emphasized that humanitarian access constraints remain very high, particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, where at least 31 local government areas are entirely or partially inaccessible due to insecurity. Acute food insecurity was projected to worsen, with 2.1 million children expected to suffer from acute malnutrition by the end of 2023 (WFP and FAO 2023, p. 18). The WFP (2023) also identifies conflict, insecurity, inflation, and climate change as key drivers of hunger, estimating that approximately 26.5 million Nigerians will face acute hunger by the lean season of 2024, up from 18.6 million in 2023. The food situation has deteriorated since 2025 due to continuing conflict and growing instability in the national economy. In the Northeast region, to be specific, the conflict has led to the displacement of 2.2 million people and left 4.4 million food insecure, with Borno State bearing the brunt of the impact. This suggests that near famine or famine-like conditions in some areas of the Northeast region may likely continue and impact many more places.

INTER-AGENCY RESPONSE TO FAMINE-LIKE CONDITIONS

The response to the food crisis has been comprehensive, encompassing emergency aid, sustainable development strategies, and initiatives to enhance resilience within affected communities. The Nigerian government, in conjunction with international organizations, has undertaken significant humanitarian efforts. The UN, particularly through agencies such as

the WFP and the FAO, has played a crucial role in providing emergency food aid, preventing widespread starvation by assisting the affected population.

The Nigerian government has introduced various initiatives to address the underlying causes of food insecurity. One notable initiative is the National Social Investment Programme (NSIP), which includes the National Home-Grown School Feeding Programme (NHGSFP). This program not only supplies nutritious meals to schoolchildren but also bolsters local agriculture by sourcing food from local farmers, thereby stimulating the local economy and ensuring a stable food supply. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also been instrumental in responding to the crisis. Organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have provided vital healthcare services, addressing malnutrition and related health issues. These organizations have established therapeutic feeding centers and mobile clinics, delivering life-saving care to the most vulnerable populations.

Also, a focus on agricultural development and livelihood restoration has accompanied immediate food assistance efforts. The Food Security Cluster (FSC), jointly led by the FAO and the WFP, coordinates food security responses during and after a humanitarian crisis. This involves addressing issues of food availability, access, utilization, and stability. The global Food Security Cluster (gFSC) provides guidance, technical and strategic support, and operational capacity to ensure national-level FSCs can effectively carry out their functions and remain accountable to affected populations. Despite these efforts, challenges persist due to limited access to affected areas, heightened by ongoing conflict, insecurity, and stretched resources.

The need for additional funding and global support remains constant, essential for meeting the needs of the affected population. Building resilience within communities is vital for long-term recovery, necessitating not only the restoration of livelihoods but also the strengthening of social cohesion and governance structures. Community-based approaches, involving local leaders and stakeholders, have been effective in fostering trust and ensuring aid reaches those in need. The response to famine and near-famine conditions in Northeast Nigeria has been comprehensive, encompassing immediate humanitarian aid, long-term development strategies, and resilience-building efforts. While significant progress has been achieved, ongoing conflict and insecurity present substantial challenges. Continued international support, combined with efforts to address the root causes of the crisis, is crucial for ensuring sustainable recovery and preventing future food insecurity.

CONCLUSION

The chapter acknowledges that Nigeria still faces significant food insecurity and famine risks in the Northeast region, even though it is one of Africa's richest economies with substantial oil resources and agricultural potential. Despite 16 years of counterinsurgency campaigns that have reduced attacks from militant groups, such as Boko Haram, recovery has been slow due to the preceding years' severe constraints on agricultural production, livelihoods, and markets. The persistence of instability and food crises in Nigeria has been attributed to a combination of natural and human-made factors, including social and economic tensions, unsustainable agricultural practices, erratic rainfall, environmental issues, insecurity, the war economy, government policies, military restrictions, and the adverse effects of counterinsurgency campaigns.

Whereas a full-blown famine has not officially been declared in Northeast Nigeria, aid agencies have reported famine-like conditions in hard-to-reach areas due to ongoing insecurity, limited access to food supply, livelihood crises, continuing displacements, and worsening humanitarian crises. The situation is projected to worsen, with several children at risk of severe acute malnutrition and death. The intricate and enduring nature of the crisis involving insurgency, counterinsurgency, and famine-like conditions in Northeast Nigeria carries significant humanitarian implications. Addressing the complex interaction of these factors requires a comprehensive approach encompassing security, humanitarian, and development measures. It is imperative to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict, ensure the protection of civilians, and address food insecurity to achieve lasting peace, stability, and development in the region. A unified and thorough response, guided by principles of humanitarian action, humanitarian law, and sustainable development, is crucial to alleviate the suffering of the millions of people impacted by food crises and famine risk in the Northeast region.

REFERENCES

- Amnesty International (2018) "Nigeria: The Harvest of Death – Three Years of Bloody Clashes between Farmers and Herders in Nigeria" (AFR 44/9503/2018). Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/9503/2018/en/> (accessed May 31, 2024).
- Burns, J.J. (2017) *Preventing the World's Next Refugee Crisis: Famine, Conflict, and Climate Change in Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen*. American Security Project. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06035> (accessed May 5, 2024).
- CfR (2013) "State of Emergency in Northern Nigeria." Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/state-emergency-northern-nigeria> (accessed May 31, 2024).
- FAO (2017) "Lake Chad Basin Crisis: Response Strategy (2017–2019): Mitigating the Impact of the Crisis and Strengthening the Resilience and Food Security of Conflict-Affected Communities." Food and Agriculture Organization. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7078e> (accessed June 19, 2025).
- FAO and WFP (2022) "Hunger Hotspots: 4 Countries Face Famine, UN Report Warns." Available at: <https://www.wfp.org/stories/hunger-hotspots-4-countries-face-famine-un-report-warns> (accessed June 19, 2025).
- The Guardian (2016) "UN Accused of Failing as North-East Nigeria at Risk of Famine." Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/14/un-accused-of-failing-as-nigerian-food-crisis-threatens-hundreds-of-thousands> (accessed May 30, 2024).
- Haruna, A. (2015) "Joblessness and the State Policy on Violent Crime: Impacts of Motorcycles Banning in Damaturu Yobe State, Nigeria." *International Journal of Advanced Research in Management and Social Sciences*, 4(10), 152–68.
- ICG (2017) "Instrument of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in Northeast Nigeria". Abuja: International Crisis Group, May 18. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b126-instruments-pain-iv-food-crisis-north-east-nigeria> (accessed June 19, 2025).
- Ikeolu, W. (2018) "Logistics Support in Asymmetric Operation: A Case Study of Op Lafiya Dole." SP/LSC/15/18. Available at: <https://www.academia.edu/36996244/> (accessed May 31, 2024).
- Institute for Security Studies (2022) "Hunger Grips the Lake Chad Basin in the Face of Terrorism." Available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/hunger-grips-lake-chad-basin-in-the-face-of-terrorism> (accessed June 19, 2025).
- Lake Chad Basin Commission (2016) "Background." Available at: <https://cblt.org/> (accessed June 19, 2025)
- Ladbury, S. et al. (2016) "Jihadi Groups and State-Building: The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria." *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 5(1), 16.
- McDappa, J. (2021) "Lafiya Dole: Africa's Old Narrative." Available at: <https://www.risetopeace.org/2021/12/21/lafiya-dole-africas-old-narrative/jmcdappa/> (accessed May 31, 2024).

- Mohammed, K. (2014) "The Message and Methods of Boko Haram in de Montclos 2014. Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria." African Studies Centre (ASC), Leiden. Available at: <https://www.academia.edu/download/107393553/1703.pdf> (accessed May 30, 2024).
- New Humanitarian, The (2017) "We Are Not the World: Inside the 'Perfect Storm' of Famine." Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/special-report/2017/03/30/we-are-not-world-inside-perfect-storm-famine> (accessed May 30, 2024).
- Ogbozor, E. (2018) "The Impact of Violent Extremism on Rural Livelihoods in the Lake Chad Basin." PhD, George Mason University. Available at: <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2051397918/abstract/a119c6c71bcc4df8pq/1> (accessed May 30, 2024).
- Ogbozor, E. (2019) "From Counter-Terrorism to Livelihood Destruction: Factors Causing Systemic and Continuing Destruction of Livelihoods in the Lake Chad Basin." *on Terrorism*, 37.
- Ogbozor, E., and Paden, J. (2015) "Preventing Violence in Nigeria's 2015 Election." Arlington, VA. Available at: <http://scar.gmu.edu/newsletter-article/preventing-violence-nigeria%E2%80%99s-2015-elections> (accessed May 31, 2024).
- Ogbozor, E. (2025) "Counterinsurgency Airstrike Mishap, Intelligence Failure, and Civilian Harm in Northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024." *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 20(2), 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675>.
- Onyi-Ogelle, H.O., and Izimah, O.U. (2023) "An Appraisal of the Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Combating Terrorism in Nigeria." *International Journal of Comparative Law and Legal Philosophy (IJOCLLEP)*, 4(2), February 21. Available at: <https://www.nigerianjournalonline.com/index.php/IJOCLLEP/article/view/3019>. (accessed June 19, 2025).
- Premium Times (2017) "Boko Haram Suicide Attacks, Last Kicks of a Dying Horse – Buhari." Available at: <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/250659-boko-haram-suicide-attacks-last-kicks-dying-horse-buhari.html> (accessed June 19, 2025).
- United Nations (2016) "'Alarming' Levels of Malnutrition and Famine-Like Conditions in North-East Nigeria – UN." Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/07/534202-alarming-levels-malnutrition-and-famine-conditions-north-east-nigeria-un> (accessed May 30, 2024)
- UNHCR (2015) "Durable Solutions Assessment: Minawao Refugee Camp." United Nations High Commission for Refugees, March 20, 2015. Available at: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/48200> (accessed June 19, 2025).
- UNOCHA (2016) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Presentation at the World Humanitarian Summit, Istanbul, May 2016.
- World Bank and UNHCR (2016) "Forced Displacement by the Boko Haram Conflict in the Lake Chad Region." Available at <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/52535> (accessed June 19, 2025).
- WFP (2016) "Lake Chad Basin Desk Review: Socio-Economic Analysis of the Lake Chad Basin Region, with Focus on Regional Environmental Factors, Armed Conflict, Gender and Food Security Issues, April 2016." Available at: <http://reliefweb.int/report/chad/lake-chad-basin-desk-review-socio-economic-analysis-lake-chad-basin-region-focus> (accessed June 19, 2025).
- WFP (2023) "2023 Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC)." Available at: <https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC2023-brief-EN.pdf> (accessed May 31, 2024).
- WFP (2025) "Understanding Famine: What It Is, How You Can Act". Available at: <https://www.wfp.org/stories/understanding-famine-what-it-how-you-can-act> (accessed June 19, 2025).
- WFP and FAO (2023) "Hunger Hotspots: FAO WFP Early Warnings on Acute Food Insecurity, June 2023 to November 2023 Outlook." Rome. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc6206en>.